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Abstract
The aim of the present study was to understand, in Portugal, relationships between the Chief Execu-
tive Officer (CEO) and the organizational performance, on the one hand, and relationships between the 
shareholder value creation and the CEO total compensation, on the other hand. This research is divided 
into two parts. The first part was examined whether organizational performance based on accounting 
measures influences organizational performance based on market measures and whether organizational 
performance based on accounting measures and market measures influences the CEO total compensation. 
The second part of the study analyses whether organizational performance, based on accounting measures 
and market measures, and the CEO total compensation influence the shareholder value creation. This 
research was based on agency theory assumptions in order to build the analysis model. The sample was 
composed of companies listed on Euronext Lisbon. The data analysis was performed using the structural 
equation modelling method. The results showed that organizational performance based on accounting 
measures influences organizational performance based on market measures, the CEO total compensation 
and the shareholder value creation.
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Resumen
El objetivo del presente estudio fue comprender, en Portugal, las relaciones entre el Director General 
(CEO) y el desempeño organizacional, por un lado, y las relaciones entre la creación de valor para los 
accionistas y la compensación total del CEO, por otro lado. Esta investigación está dividida en dos partes. 
La primera parte fue examinada si el desempeño organizacional basado en medidas contables influye en 
el desempeño organizacional basado en medidas de mercado y si el desempeño organizacional basado en 
medidas contables y medidas de mercado influye en la compensación total del CEO. La segunda parte 
del estudio analiza si el desempeño organizacional, basado en medidas contables y medidas de mercado, 
y la compensación total del CEO influyen en la creación de valor para el accionista. Esta investigación se 
basó en suposiciones de teoría de agencia para construir el modelo de análisis. La muestra estaba com-
puesta por empresas que figuran en Euronext Lisbon. El análisis de datos se realizó utilizando el método 
de modelado de ecuaciones estructurales. Los resultados mostraron que el desempeño organizacional 
basado en medidas contables influye en el desempeño organizacional basado en medidas de mercado, la 
compensación total del CEO y la creación de valor para el accionista.
Código JEL: G10, G35
Palabras clave: Teoría de agencia; Desempeño organizacional; Compensación de CEO y Creación de valor para el 
accionista
Introduction
Doubleday and Wagner (2009) stated that the paradigm of corporate governance has 
drastically changed CEO compensation. In the past, investors did not have a say on how the 
CEO was paid. If the shareholders were unhappy, they had few options other than selling their 
own stocks. According to these authors, the recommendations of the executive board regarding 
the CEO compensation were approved by the respective remuneration committees with little 
independence, using the rival companies to assess the compensation competitiveness or to 
establish performance goals, if they even existed.
Currently, literature has shown that the assessment of the CEO compensation has drastically 
changed (e.g., Lilling, 2006; Ozkan, 2007; Shaw & Zhang 2010). Investors have started to have 
an active role and a say on compensation. According to Doubleday and Wagner (2009), the 
executive board faces an increasing scrutiny by shareholders, press, legislators and regulators 
and at the same time tries to balance the interests of the shareholders and CEO. The CEO has 
started to have a secondary role in a process that used to be led by them. A strong performance 
evaluation system assesses whether the interests of the shareholder are being safeguarded 
or not, thus providing support for decision making. These developments are changing CEO 
compensation, as companies optimize the connection between remuneration and performance 
through short and long term incentives.
The relationship between the CEO compensation and the shareholder value creation has 
caught the attention of investors over time. In accordance with Gong (2011), academics, 
legislators and the press have discussed the high salaries of CEO, questioning if these are 
consistent with the shareholders’ interests. As claimed by this author, the existing studies do not 
show consistent results about the outcome of the performance of the CEO compensation, and 
these studies have raised concerns about how the compensation is able to align the interests of 
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both the CEO and the shareholders. Several examples of the lack of alignment of these interests 
showed up during the so-called “subprime” crisis, highlighting the case of the Wall Street CEO 
compensation, which led to a strong debate in the US. 
Given the gaps in the current research, the goal of this research is divided into two parts. 
The first part examines whether organizational performance based on accounting measures 
influences organizational performance based on market measures and whether organizational 
performance based on accounting measures and market measures influences the CEO total 
compensation. The second part of the study analyses whether organizational performance, based 
on accounting measures and market measures, and the CEO total compensation influences the 
shareholder value creation. 
This research intends to provide, theoretically, a greater understanding about the CEO 
compensation level in the listed companies in Portugal and how it is affected by the different 
types of organizational performance measures (accounting and market) and also aims to 
contribute to the assessment on how the CEO compensation and organizational performance 
behaviour affect the shareholder value creation. In practical terms, it intends to clarify for the 
shareholders and other stakeholders the influence of organizational performance on the CEO 
compensation and the impact of latter on the shareholder value creation. 
To address the objective of the study and related research hypotheses, this research is 
divided into three sections. In the first one, the theoretical concepts related to the agency theory 
are analysed and the theoretical foundations related to the variables, on which this study is 
based, are presented to support the key issues that need to be answered. In the second section, 
the objectives of the study will be described, plus the analysis model, the descriptive analysis, 
the data collection process and the selected statistical techniques for the treatment of the data. 
In the third section the results of the applied tests to the model are shown and, finally, the 
theoretical discussion of these results.
The agency theory, variables and formulation of research hypotheses
Agency Theory
The split that emerged after the industrial revolution between owners and managers, with 
the first holding the property but not a significant control over it, and the last controlling but not 
having a significant ownership, brought about a new relationship in companies (Berle & Means 
1932), the so-called “agency relation” (Ross, 1973). Ross (1973) defined this relationship as 
one of the most ancient and common types of social interaction. As claimed by this author, an 
agency relation arises between two or more parts, when one of them, the agent, acts on behalf 
of, or as representative of the other part, called the principal, in the particular field of decision-
making.
As reported by Eisenhardt (1989) and Bloom and Milkovich (1998), the agency relation 
presumes that both parts (principal and agent) are subject to three behavioural assumptions: 
rationality, effort aversion and risk aversion. Rationality exists because it enables agents and 
principals to assess the probability of future contingencies in order to protect their own interests 
(Baiman, 1990). The effort aversion exists because the agents want to dedicate the least possible 
work in the execution of their tasks without reducing their compensation (Bloom & Milkovich, 
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1998). The risk aversion exists because job security and the compensation of the agents rely on 
a unique entity (Balkin et al., 2000). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that, if principal and agent maximize the utility for 
their own benefit, there is a good chance that the agent will not always act in the best interests 
of the principal, thus creating the so-called “agency problem”. The agency problem arises when 
cooperative parties have different goals and perspectives about the work (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
which means that the cooperative behaviour that maximizes the general interests doesn’t match 
the individual interest of each protagonist (Baiman, 1990). According to Chua et al. (2003), the 
agency problem is related to the divergence of interests, information asymmetry and limited 
rationality. 
The principal may incur a loss, the so-called “agency costs”, whenever the agent pursues 
different goals from the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As Tosi et al. (2000) mentioned, 
this is the outcome of the agency problem previously discussed, i.e., the agents don’t like to 
take risks and have personal interests that may diverge from the principal’s interests. These 
assumptions suggest that the agents may undertake actions based on their own agenda, which 
seeks to accomplish their individual goals (Tosi et al., 2000). Jensen and Meckling (1976) noted 
that agency costs emerge in any relationship that involves cooperative endeavour between two 
or more parties. These authors defined the agency costs as the sum of the expenses spent on a 
monitoring system, bonding costs and residual loss. The monitoring system is intended to limit 
the abnormal activities of the agent. The bonding costs ensure that the agent won’t undertake 
certain actions that could harm the principal or, at least, guarantee that the principal will be 
reimbursed if those actions take place. The residual loss is the reduction of the benefits by the 
principal, as a result of the conflict of interests between the agent and the principal, even after 
the application of a monitoring system´s bonding costs. 
The agency theory’s unit of analysis is the contract that establishes the work relationship 
between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989), containing the rights and responsibilities 
of each part, (Baiman, 1990). This contract includes remuneration agreements, information 
systems, functions assigned to the agent and rights of the principal (Baiman, 1990). It’s also 
through the contract that the principal tries to link his or her own interests to the agent’s interests 
(Tosi et al., 1997). Eisenhardt (1989) claimed that the theory focuses on assessing the most 
efficient contract, given the existing assumptions about the individuals, the organizations and 
the information. The developed theory about the efficiency of the agency contract points to two 
solutions that can be chosen by the principal to solve the agent-principal problem (Tosi et al., 
2000). First, when the principal has full access to complete information about the agent’s efforts, 
the most efficient contract is based on the observation of the agent’s behaviour (monitoring). 
This choice prevents a contract being based on results which transfer, unnecessarily, the risks 
to the agent, who is reluctant to take risks.  In the second choice, when the principal is unable 
to monitor the agent’s efforts, and information asymmetry is high, the principal has to transfer 
the risks to the agent, through an incentive contract.
Tosi et al. (1997) declared that the solution to the agency problem doesn’t depend on a 
direct selection of monitoring systems and incentives. According to these authors, since the 
performance can be measured both by the actions and the results of these actions, the first 
choice of the principal should focus on creating a balance between base compensation (based on 
behaviour) and the additional incentives (based on results). This balance is known as “optimal 
contract”, which maximizes the return of investment to the principal through modifications 
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to the monitoring structure and compensation of the agent so that the desired changes in 
organizational success are achieved (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).
Several management accounting tools can be used as monitoring, evaluation and incentives 
systems to mitigate the agency problem. Among the several internal monitoring strategies 
of the companies that mitigate the agency problem, Wickramasinghe and Alawattage (2007) 
highlight the performance evaluation systems. Luft (2009) added that performance evaluation 
may be used to give rewards like bonuses, capital instruments and promotions. The performance 
evaluation applies to both individuals and organizations (Burke & Litwin, 1992) and is, 
generally, operated by objective performance measures (Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002).
Variables
The variables used in this study are:
CEO total compensation: The CEO compensation is measured according to Miller et al. 
(2002) definition of “CEO total compensation”, which includes all the forms of compensation, 
like the base compensation, bonus, stock options, restricted stocks and other remuneration 
types.
Organizational Performance Based on Accounting Measures: In agreement with Richard et 
al. (2009), accounting measures are the most common and simplest way to assess organizational 
performance and many authors have employed this kind of measures to determine it (e.g., 
Murphy, 2001). The accounting measures used in the present study were selected based on the 
measures identified by Richard et al. (2009). The chosen measures were the ones that achieved 
significant results with CEO compensation in previous research (e.g., Perry & Zenner, 2001). 
The two selected measures were: net income and Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, 
and Amortization (EBITDA). Richard et al. (2009) mentioned that, despite the credibility of 
accounting measures having been proved, these measures are subjected to distortions originating 
from the adopted accounting politics, human error and fraud. These authors highlighted that, 
due to its dependence on auditable information, accounting measures reflect what happened and 
are very limited in predicting about future performance. In order to mitigate the gaps of these 
measures in evaluating organizational performance, the variable organizational performance 
based on market measures has been added.
Organizational Performance Based on Market Measures: According to Richard et al. 
(2009), the advantages of market measures are to predict the future and incorporate the value 
of intangible assets (e.g., brand image) in a more efficient way than by just using accounting 
information. Many authors (e.g., Core et al., 2003) used these measures to assess organizational 
performance. The market measures used in the present study were selected based on the 
measures identified by Richard et al. (2009) and combined, considering the study of Murphy 
et al. (1996). The chosen measures were the ones that achieved significant results with CEO 
compensation in previous studies (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008). Consequently, the selected 
measures were: basic Earnings Per Share (EPS) and stock price. Basic EPS correspond to 
International Accounting Standard 33 definition and stock price correspond to quotation price 
of the common stocks on a regulated market at year end. These measures make part of the 
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“profit” dimension identified by Murphy et al. (1996). Like accounting measures, market 
measures also have some disadvantages. To Merchant (2007), the market does not always 
reflect the effective performance. That means that some of these evaluations are very influenced 
by future expectations that will never become reality. The author added that paying bonuses 
based on market measures is risky, as these payments can be made based on results that will 
never come true.
Shareholder Value Creation: Shareholder value creation is measured using the Market 
Value Added (MVA) method. MVA is calculated by subtracting the amount invested by the 
shareholders to the market value of capital (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2008). According to Hillman 
and Keim (2001), the market value of capital is equal to the market capitalization of a company 
and the amount invested by the shareholders is the subscript capital.
Formulation of Research Hypotheses
It is expected that the variables organizational performance based on accounting measures 
and organizational performance based on market measures influence positively and significantly 
the CEO total compensation. This presumption is based on the assumption that companies use 
optimal contracts (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998) to align the interests of the CEO with 
organizational performance and with the interests of shareholders (e.g., Tosi et al., 1997), 
thus mitigating the agency problem (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since the interests of 
shareholders depend directly on organizational performance (e.g., a high net income represents, 
theoretically, a higher dividend or investment), it is expected that organizational performance 
has a major impact on the CEO total compensation. This expectation is supported by the 
Portuguese corporate governance report model, which refers in §70, point III, Section D, Part 
I, that the remuneration should be structured “(...) in order to align the interests of members 
of the administration with the long-term interests of society (...)” and based on “performance 
evaluation” (Regulation No. 4/2013). Murphy (2001), Perry and Zenner (2001) and Kateratorn 
(2013) used accounting measures to prove the existence of a relationship between organizational 
performance and CEO compensation. Murphy (1998), Core et al. (2003) and Johnson et al. 
(2008) demonstrated the same by using market measures.
Based on the literature referred to, the following research hypotheses were formulated:
H1: Organizational performance based on accounting measures influences organizational 
performance based on market measures. 
H2: Organizational performance based on accounting measures influences CEO total 
compensation. 
H3: Organizational performance based on market measures influences CEO total compensation.
In addition to the influence of organizational performance on the CEO total compensation, 
there is the influence of organizational performance on shareholder value creation. Since it 
is predictable that organizational performance based on accounting and market measures 
influences the CEO total compensation and the CEO total compensation influences shareholder 
value creation, then it is correct to predict that organizational performance based on accounting 
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and market measures influences the shareholder value creation. Thus, it is expected that the 
organizational performance based on accounting measures and the organizational performance 
based on market measures influence, in a positive and significant way, the shareholder value 
creation. This correlation is based on the assumption of Merchant (2007) that the market 
assimilates all available information on a given company and reflects it in its assessment of the 
same, which varies the shareholder value creation. The relationship between the accounting and 
market measures and the shareholder value creation has been proven previously, for example, 
by Milunovich and Tsuei (1996), Uyemura et al. (1996) and Vijayakumar (2008). Finally, as 
referred to above, it is expected that the CEO total compensation influences the shareholder 
value creation in a positive and significant way. This influence is based on the assumption of 
optimal contract use of CEO compensation schemes to mitigate the agency problem and align 
their interests with the interests of shareholders (e.g., Tosi et al., 1997). This relationship has 
been proved earlier by Sheikholeslami (2001), Fatemi et al. (2003) and Baum et al. (2004).
Based on the contributions in the literature, the following research hypotheses have been 
added:
H4: Organizational performance based on accounting measures influences the shareholder 
value creation.
H5: Organizational performance based on market measures influences the shareholder value 
creation.
H6: CEO total compensation influences the shareholder value creation.
Method and data
Objective and analysis model
The objective of the present research is divided into two parts. The first part intends to verify 
whether organizational performance based on accounting measures influences organizational 
performance based on market measures (H1) and whether organizational performance based 
on accounting measures and market measures influences the CEO total compensation (H2 
and H3). The second part of the study analyses whether organizational performance, based 
on accounting measures and market measures, and the CEO total compensation influence the 
shareholder value creation (H4, H5 and H6). This study is also based on the assumptions of 
the agency theory on the principal/agent (Shareholder/CEO) relation, predicted by Eisenhardt 
(1989), the agency problem and agency costs (with monitoring, bonding costs and residual 
loss), predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and the agency contract (that establishes the 
work relationship between the principal and the agent), predicted by Tosi et al. (1997), to build 
the analysis model. 
The hypothetical analysis model can be divided into two parts, as already mentioned 
concerning the objective of the research. The first part is formulated based on the contributions 
from studies that successfully linked the selected measures of organizational performance and 
the CEO compensation. These measures are the net income (e.g., Murphy, 2001), EBITDA 
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(e.g., Kateratorn, 2013), basic EPS (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008) and the stock price (e.g., 
Core et al., 2013). Based on the classification from the study of Richard et al. (2009) and 
the dimensions of the study of Murphy et al. (1996), the different organizational performance 
measures were grouped in order to assess two variables not directly observable: organizational 
performance based on accounting measures and organizational performance based on market 
measures. Through the definition of compensation by Miller et al. (2002) the variable CEO 
total compensation was assessed. These contributions support the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 of 
this study. 
The second part of the model is built based on the contributions of the studies that positively 
and significantly link the selected measures of organizational performance and the CEO 
compensation to the shareholder value creation, which is measured by the MVA (e.g., Baum 
et al., 2004; Vijayakumar, 2008). These contributions support the hypothesis H4, H5 and H6 of 
this study.
Data collection and sample
Data were collected from the Annual Reports and Accounts, including the Consolidated 
Financial Statements (in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standard 10), 
Reports on Corporate Governance (when this is an annex to the Annual Report and Accounts, 
published separately), both of them with mandatory disclosure to the public in accordance with 
Article 245 of the Código dos Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and the Euronext Lisbon webpage 
(CVM, 1999). The sample comprises 211 observations of companies (in the whole sample 
period) admitted to trading on the regulated market (Article 199 of the CVM) Eurolist by 
Euronext Lisbon (hereinafter Euronext Lisbon), managed by Euronext Lisbon - Sociedade 
Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, SA (Portaria No. 556/2005 of 27 June), which is the 
main spot market in Portugal (CMVM 2015). These companies are listed on the Portuguese 
Stock Index (PSI) Geral that “includes all of the companies listed on Euronext Lisbon” 
(Euronext Lisbon, 2013, p. 5).
The reporting period covers five years, in accordance with the deadline for making public 
the annual reports and accounts (No. 1 , Article 245 of the CVM). This selected period begins 
in 2010 and finishes in 2014, the last year having the annual report and accounts published at 
the time of collecting the data used in this study. Excluded from the sample were the entities 
that were not listed on the Euronext Lisbon during the periods of 2013 and 2014 and the Sports 
Companies, given their specificity about the goals to be achieved (e.g., sporting success) or the 
motivation of investors in stocks acquisition (e.g., affectivity).
The sample is composed of several types of entities that integrate the main sectors of 
activities (see Table 1).
The analysis of Table 1 shows that the sector with the highest percentage is Industrials 
(30%), followed by Consumer Services (21%) and Financial Services (12%). The Oil & Gas 
sector includes only one company in the sample, but the relative weight is 2.3%. It is also 
noteworthy the annual average growth of 6.4% in the Oil & Gas sector and 4% in the Utilities 
sector. On the contrary, the Telecommunications sector showed a very significant negative 
annual variation (-60%), followed by the Financial Services sector (18%).
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Table 1 
Number of companies by sector of activity and its growth.
Sectors of activity n % Annual average rate of change
Industrials 12 27,9 0,14%
Consumer Services 9 20,9 4,11%
Telecommunications 2 4,7 -59,67%
Financial Services 5 11,6 -18,23%
Consumer Goods 3 7,0 2,42%
Utilities 3 7,0 3,80%
Basic Materials 4 9,3 2,45%
Technology 4 9,3 -2,16%
Oil & Gas 1 2,3 6,39%
Total 43 100 -0,01%
Source: Based on Euronext Lisbon, 2013, and company websites.
Statistical Methods and Treatment of Data
The Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is the method selected for processing the data in 
this study. According to Schreiber et al. (2006), the SEM are statistical techniques that can be 
used to reduce the number of variables observed in a smaller number of latent variables through 
the analysis of covariance between the observed variables. In order to process the data, the 
model’s position and its variables were analysed given the assumptions of the SEM, the quality 
of adjustment was tested and, finally, the estimates of the model parameters were calculated, 
i.e., the weight of the regressions of the direct and indirect relationships between the variables 
and the correspondent level of significance. In the analysis for decisionmaking about whether 
or not to validate the research hypotheses being studied, a 5% significance level was assumed. 
The model design and statistical tests were made using the AMOS (v. 19, SPSS Inc, Chicago, 
IL) and SPSS (v. 19) software.
Analysis, results and discussion
Diagnostic of the Assumptions of Structural Equation Modelling
Like most statistical techniques, SEM is based on assumptions that must be respected so that 
the results are reliable (Finney & DiStefano, 2006). Schreiber et al. (2006) recommend that the 
assumptions about the absence of outliers are analysed, plus the sample size, the multivariate 
normality of the data and also the absence of multicollinearity among manifest variables. These 
assumptions are analysed separately in the paragraphs below.
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According to Marôco (2014), outliers can be registration errors or actual extreme values, 
suggesting the Mahalanobis Distance measure (D2) to diagnose multivariate outliers. The 
Mahalanobis Distance consists of the calculation of two probabilities (p1 e p2). An observation 
that registers a reduced value in both probabilities can be classified as multivariate outlier. 
These observations were removed to make the subsequent analysis. Considering the reference 
value suggested in the literature (e.g., Schreiber et al., 2006), 5%, 27 multivariate outliers were 
detected in this study. These observations were removed to make the subsequent analysis.
Regarding the assumption about sample size, Schreiber et al. (2006) reported that there is no 
specific rule about the exact number of observations that a sample should contain in the SEM. 
However, there is a general consensus of 10 observations per parameter to be estimated in a 
model. Thus, the ratio of observations should not be less than 10/1. The study model consists of 
18 parameters (10 regressions, 1 covariance and 7 variances) and the number of observations is 
184. Considering the criterion mentioned by the authors, the sample size fulfills the assumption 
to apply the SEM technique, since the ratio of participants per parameter is 10.22 (184/18) to 1.
In the analysis of data distribution, according to Marôco (2014), the most used distribution 
measures are asymmetry and kurtosis. These measures are operationalized through the 
calculation of univariate asymmetry, univariate kurtosis and multivariate kurtosis. Finney 
and DiStefano (2006) reported that when univariate asymmetry and univariate kurtosis 
approximate values of 2 and 7, respectively, they indicate the existence of problems related to 
normality. For these authors, a value of multivariate kurtosis greater than 10 indicates severe 
violation of normality. The results show that the manifested variables present values higher 
than the reference values suggested by the authors, indicating a severe violation of the normal 
distribution. Since the data do not meet the assumption of the normal distribution, the function 
Maximum Likelihood cannot be used to estimate the model.
In cases of violation of the normal distribution, Marôco (2014) suggests, among other 
methods, the use of Bootstrap estimation. This method involves repeating random samples, 
replacing the original sample with a new Bootstrap sample and thus calculating standard errors 
for the hypotheses tested (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). This form of Bootstrap, known as 
non-parametric Bootstrap, does not depend on population distribution (Enders, 2002).
Bootstrap estimation requires the absence of missing values (Jose, 2013) and, to meet 
this requirement, its imputation was made. From the analysis, it was found that the missing 
values of the sample are concentrated in variable EBITDA. This variable was not calculated 
for the entities classified by Euronext Lisbon as Financial Services, since the specificities of 
this activity make EBITDA an irrelevant ratio (e.g., financing expenditures are part of the 
operating activities). For this reason, the number of missing values is equal to the number of 
entities classified as Financial Services that are part of the sample in each of the five periods 
being analysed, which totals 22 missing values, corresponding to 12% of the total sample for 
EBITDA variable. These values were imputed by the Expectation Maximization algorithm. 
According to Olinsky et. al. (2003), Expectation Maximization is the most used method to deal 
with missing values. This method performs an iteration, through a process, to initially estimate 
the missing information and then the parameters. The iteration process ends when the estimated 
parameters converge on some pre-established criteria.
Finally, the assumption of multicollinearity refers to the high correlations between manifest 
variables (Grewal, Cote & Baumgartner, 2004). For Hair et al. (2011), the information of an 
indicator may prove to be redundant due to high levels of multicollinearity in the model, which 
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may result in indicators without statistical significance. O’Brien (2007) pointed out that the 
degree of multicollinearity of the indicators should be analysed to determine the redundancy 
by calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) or Tolerance. A VIF value of 5 or greater or 
a Tolerance value of less than 0.200 indicates potential multicollinearity problems (O’Brien, 
2007; Hair et al., 2011). Given the criteria recommended by Hair et al. (2011), this assumption 
is not violated since all the variables obtained a VIF value less than 5 and a Tolerance value 
greater to 0.200.
Adjustment Quality Diagnosis
According to Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003) and Schreiber et al. (2006), the selected tests 
for quality adjustment assessment of the SEM in this study are the Chi-square test (χ2), inferential 
test, the ratio χ2/degrees of freedom (df), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), descriptive indexes of 
general adjustment, and the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) and the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), which are descriptive indexes based on the comparison of models. Additionally, it’s 
calculated the corrected χ2 Bollen-Stine test for data that do not follow a normal distribution 
(Bollen & Stine, 1992). The following table summarizes the results of selected tests.
Table 2 
Model quality diagnosis tests results.
Diagnostic Test Result Observations
𝜒2 and corrected 𝜒2 4.911 p-value = 0.297 and p-value = 0.306
𝜒2/df 1.228
RMSEA 0.035 p-value = 0.510; CL = 90%
SRMR 0.026
NNFI 0.989
CFI 0.997
Notes: 𝜒2 = Qui-square; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR 
= Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; IC = 
Confidence Level.
According to the results shown in Table 2, quality adjustment tests point out that the 
model has a good fit (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003; Schreiber et al., 2006; Marôco, 2014). 
The statistical test results of χ2 is 4.911 with a p-value associated 0.297, i.e., the matrix of 
population covariance does not differ significantly from the covariance matrix estimated by the 
model (null hypothesis), and the result of the ratio χ2/df is 1.228. As the χ2 test is sensitive to the 
violation of the normal distribution assumption, and the manifest variables in this study violate 
this assumption, it was calculated the corrected χ2 Bollen-Stine test (Bollen & Stine, 1992) that 
obtained a p-value of 0.306 in two thousand Bootstrap samples, confirming the adequacy of the 
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model. The descriptive indexes of general adjustment RMSEA and SRMR obtained a result of, 
respectively, 0.035 (P[rmsea≤0.05]=0.510; confidence level 90%) and 0.026. The descriptive 
indexes of model comparison NNFI and CFI obtained the results of, respectively, 0.989 and 
0.997.
Standardized Estimates and Significance of Trajectories
This point begins with the presentation of the final structural equations model of this study. 
The model consists of two latent variables, six manifest variables and seven unique factors or 
errors (e). It also has a correlation identified between the errors. Measurement errors of the net 
income and basic EPS variables are correlated by the reason that the last uses the first in the 
calculation formula. The research hypotheses (H) are also shortly identified and the directional 
paths that represent them.
Figure 1. Final structural equation model.
Referring to Figure 1, the values that follow the directional paths point to the standardized 
coefficients (β) of the parameters of the relationship they represent. The values placed in the 
upper right side of the latent and manifest variables indicate the squared multiple correlation 
coefficients (R2). The significance level of the parameters estimated by the model was obtained 
using the estimation process for Bootstrap, which simulated two thousand samples.
The results point to a correlation between measurement errors of the manifest variables 
net income and basic EPS of 0.34 (R = 0.340, p <0.001), as expected. Factorial weights of 
organizational performance based on accounting measures in EBITDA and net income are, 
respectively, 0.72 and 0.52 (λ = 0.72 and λ = 0.52), and the proportion of explained variance 
is 51% and 27% (R2 = 0.51 and R2 = 0.27). The factor weights of organizational performance 
based on market measures in basic EPS and stock price are, respectively, 0.52 and 0.92 (λ = 
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0.52 and λ = 0.92), and the proportion of the explained variance is 27% and 84% (R2 = 0.2 
and R2 = 0.84). All factors have high factor weights (λ ≥ 0.5), indicating factorial validity, and 
appropriate individual reliabilities (R2 ≥ 0.25) (Marôco, 2014). Standardized path coefficients 
and multiple correlation coefficients, including its statistical significance, will be analysed 
separately.
Table 3 contains the standardized coefficients and the respective significance levels, which 
statistically evaluate the formulated hypotheses in this research.
Table 3  
Statistical Results of the Formulated Hypotheses.
H Path Coefficient P-value
H1
Organizational performance based on accounting measures ⟶ 
organizational performance based on market measures
0.65 <0.001
H2
Organizational performance based on accounting measures ⟶ CEO 
total compensation 0.91 <0.001
H3
Organizational performance based on market measures ⟶ CEO total 
compensation -0.23 0.130
H4
Organizational performance based on accounting measures ⟶ 
shareholder value creation 0.81 0.034
H5
Organizational performance based on market measures ⟶ 
shareholder value creation 0.24 0.483
H6 CEO total compensation ⟶ shareholder value creation -0.37 0.107
Notes: H = Hypotheses; CEO = Chief Executive Officer.
According to Table 3 data, the effect of organizational performance based on accounting 
measures on organizational performance based on market measures (β = 0.650, p < 0.001) 
and the effect of organizational performance based on accounting measures in the CEO total 
compensation (β = 0.910, p < 0.001) are positive and statistically significant. The effect of 
organizational performance based on market measures in CEO total compensation is not positive 
or statistically significant (β = -0.230, p = 0.130). The effect of organizational performance based 
on accounting measures in shareholder value creation is positive and statistically significant (β 
= 0.810, p = 0.034). The effect of organizational performance based on market measures on 
the shareholder value creation is positive but not statistically significant (β = 0.240, p = 0.483). 
Finally, the effect of CEO total compensation in shareholder value creation is negative and not 
statistically significant (β = -0.370, p = 0.107).
The squared multiple correlation coefficients and the respective levels of significance that assess 
the variability of a given variable with respect to the predictors used for this variable are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4 
Variability Analysis.
Variable Squared Multiple Correlation p-value
Organizational performance based on market measures 42% <0.001
CEO total compensation 61% <0.001
Shareholder value creation 58% 0.003
Note: CEO = Chief Executive Officer.
Analysing the data presented in Table 4, it was concluded that the model explains 42% 
of the variability of organizational performance based on market measures (R2 = 0.423, p < 
0.001), 61% of the CEO total compensation variability (R2 = 0.611, p < 0.001) e 58% of the 
shareholder value creation variability (R2 = 0.576, p = 0.003). 
Discussion
The research hypotheses H1, H2 and H4 were confirmed. Hypothesis 1 confirms that the 
market absorbs all available information on a given company and reflects it in its assessment of 
the same (e.g., Merchant, 2007). Therefore, the better or worse the organizational performance 
based on accounting measures, the better or worse is the organizational performance based on 
market measures.
Hypothesis 2 corroborates the assumption that optimal contract of the agency theory 
establishes a link between organizational performance (in this case, based on accounting 
measures) and the CEO total compensation (e.g., Tosi et al., 1997; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). 
This result means that the companies listed on Euronext Lisbon recognize the existence of 
the agency problem (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Baiman, 1990), originated by the CEO/
Shareholder relationship (e.g., Ross, 1973), and use the agency contract (e.g., Tosi et al., 1997) 
to mitigate the costs associated with this problem (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Tosi et 
al., 2000). To achieve that, these entities use accounting measures (e.g., Luft, 2009). In this 
situation, the shareholder selects the performance evaluation system that specifies the measures 
that will be based on the compensation of the CEO and the function linking these measures to 
compensation. Thus, the better or worse the organizational performance based on accounting 
measures, the higher or lower the CEO total compensation. This hypothesis also confirms 
that the analysed entities comply with the recommendation of the Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) on the dependence of the CEO’s compensation on the CEO’s 
performance (Regulamento No. 4/2013). The result of this research hypothesis is consistent 
with the conclusions of the studies of Murphy (2001), Perry and Zenner (2001) and Kateratorn 
(2013).
Research hypothesis 4 indicates that a positive or negative variation on the shareholder value 
creation is explained in part by the organizational performance based on accounting measures. 
As the effect of organizational performance based on accounting measures on organizational 
performance based on market measures, the effect predicted by this hypothesis is based on 
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the assumption that the market assimilates all available information on a given company and 
reflects it in its assessment (e.g., Merchant, 2007), which causes variations on the shareholder 
value creation. This result adds to the results of studies such as Milunovich and Tsuei (1996), 
Uyemura et al. (1996) and Vijayakumar (2008). Overall, the organizational performance based 
on accounting measures assumes an essential position in the analysed entities. Both the CEO 
total compensation and the shareholder value creation depend on the behaviour of this variable. 
This dependence, when excessive or when not shared with other measures, such as market 
measures, can damage the fixation of the CEO total compensation and the perception of the 
shareholder on the intrinsic value of the entities. This injury results from distortions caused by 
accounting policies adopted, human error and fraud (e.g., Richard et al., 2009).
The research hypotheses H3, H5 and H6 were not confirmed because they did not present 
statistically significant results. That is, it was not possible to prove the effect of organizational 
performance based on market measures on the CEO’s total compensation. Likewise, the effect 
of organizational performance based on market measures on the shareholder value creation was 
not corroborated. The effect of the CEO’s total compensation on shareholder value creation has 
also not been proven.
In relation to variability, the results point out that more than half of the variability of the 
CEO total compensation and the shareholder value creation is explained by its predictors in the 
model. The predictors of the CEO total compensation are organizational performance based 
on accounting measures and market measures and predictors of shareholder value creation are 
the organizational performance, based on accounting measures and market measures, and CEO 
total compensation. The explained variability of the CEO total compensation, slightly above 
60%, reflects the balance between monitoring and incentives (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998), 
i.e. the agency contract (e.g., Tosi et al., 1997) uses sufficient incentives to align the agent’s 
interests with the interests of the principal, without transferring too much risk and remuneration 
variability to the agent, reflecting a balance between monitoring and incentives (e.g., Baiman, 
1990). With respect to the variability explained by the predictors of organizational performance 
based on market measures, basic EPS, stock price and organizational performance based on 
accounting measures, corresponds only to 42%, i.e. less than half. This suggests replacing or 
adding organizational performance predictors based on market measures.
Conclusion
The objective of this study was divided into two parts. The first part examined whether 
organizational performance based on accounting measures influences organizational 
performance based on market measures (H1) and organizational performance, based on 
accounting measures and market measures, influences CEO total compensation (H2 and H3). 
The second examined whether organizational performance, based on accounting measures and 
market measures, and CEO total compensation influence the shareholder value creation (H4, 
H5 and H6). 
This study used agency theory assumptions to build the analysis model. The sample was 
composed by the companies admitted to trading on the regulated market Eurolist by Euronext 
Lisbon. Data were collected from the Annual Reports and Accounts, including the Consolidated 
Financial Statements, Reports on Corporate Governance and the Euronext Lisbon webpage. 
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Data were processed using the SEM method. 
The hypotheses H1, H2 and H4 were confirmed. Hypothesis 1 confirmed that the evaluation 
of a company by the market is conditioned by the accounting measures. Hypothesis 2 confirmed 
that the organizational performance based on accounting measures determines the CEO total 
compensation. Hypothesis 4 has confirmed that the organizational performance based on 
accounting measures conditions the shareholder value creation.
This research contributes, theoretically, to strengthen the explanation of the factors that 
affect organizational performance based on accounting measures behaviour, the CEO total 
compensation behaviour and the shareholder value creation behaviour (e.g., Lilling, 2006; 
Merchant, 2007; Shaw & Zhang, 2010). This research contributes, in practical terms, to help 
in clarifying matters for the stakeholders of the listed companies in Portugal, in particular 
shareholders, who are its owners. The results of this study show that the listed companies in 
Portugal comply with the CMVM recommendation on the dependence of the compensation of 
the CEO’s performance, at least with regard to organizational performance based on selected 
accounting measures.
The main limitation of this study is related to the form of disclosure of the CEO compensation. 
The form of disclosure for the CEO compensation imposed by CMVM does not favour the 
collection of data. The fact that a standard model is not available for companies to publish 
information related to the compensation of members of the Company’s Board of Directors 
makes it difficult to collect and impairs the collected information itself.
For future research, it is suggested to undertake methodologically similar studies with a 
modification in the number of manifest variables. The manifest variables explained by the 
organizational performance based on market measures, basic EPS and stock price, could 
be increased or replaced taking into account the negative results obtained in this study. The 
number of manifest variables explained by the organizational performance based on accounting 
measures and market measures could be increased and eventually lead to more robust results 
of the model as advocates Marôco (2014). Additionally, as future studies intends to extend the 
study to the other European countries.
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